(Published in the Financial Times on 29 June 2014)
As the Financial Times' John Authers rightly points out,
"active share" — the portion of a fund that differs from its
benchmark —should never be used in isolation to assess funds ("Active fund
managers are closet index huggers", March 12). The notion that there exists
a simple measure to predict performance is clearly absurd.
Furthermore, whether or not it should be used in conjunction
with other tools is also contentious. Research by Martijn Cremers, professor of
finance at the University of Notre Dame, and Antti Petajisto, a portfolio
manager at BlackRock and former assistant professor of finance at Yale, found
that, net of costs, high active share funds on average performed better than
index funds, which in turn performed better than low active share funds. This
was certainly an interesting conclusion, but why should it be true that high active
share funds tend to perform well?
Ross Miller, finance professor at the State University of
New York, devised a clever way to demonstrate why closet index funds were a bad
idea. His insight was that any fund could be divided into two parts: a passive
portion that correlated 100 per cent with the benchmark and an active portion
that was 0 per cent correlated.
By assigning typical passive fund fees to the passive
portion one could then calculate the effective fee (the actual fee less the
passive fee) that one was paying for the active portion.
In the case of the benchmark huggers, the active fee was so
high — in some cases as high as 7 per cent — that the chances of producing sufficient
alpha, or excess returns, to cover it as well as leaving a big chunk for unit
holders were negligible.
High active share funds are therefore the ones giving
themselves a chance to produce sufficient alpha, but why do they also tend to succeed
in this endeavour?
There are essentially two ways to get a high active share:
run a fairly concentrated portfolio, taking little notice of benchmark constituent
weights, or run a diversified portfolio full of stocks that are not in the
benchmark. There are few if any funds that fall into the latter category, so
the argument is really about why concentrated portfolios are a good idea.
Skill, and thus good performance, is about first spotting
and then taking advantage of price anomalies. It is other investors — "the
market" — that create the price anomalies in the first place, so good
performance will always be at the expense of others. Alpha generation is after
all a zero-sum game.
The behavioural trait known as herding from time to time
takes prices to levels that, with analysis, can be declared cheap or expensive.
Such mis-valuations — or mispricings — can be tiny ones that correct in a few
seconds or hours, or bigger ones that correct over a few years. Jim Simons,
founder of hedge fund Renaissance Technologies, uses a very powerful and very
quick computer to spot the tiny ones before anyone else. Others are more
interested in the longer ones.
Longer-term price anomalies are well documented. Sanjoy
Basu, former professor of finance at McMaster University in Ontario, and Robert
Shiller, professor of economics at Yale, found that stocks with high dividend
yields outperform stocks with low dividend yields. US economist Eugene Fama and
Kenneth French, professor of finance at Dartmouth College, showed that this
predictability increased with time: while over one year the dividend yield
explained 15 per cent of the variation in excess returns, over five years it explained
60 per cent.
It seems that investors systematically overestimate the
extent to which growth stocks will grow. Since it is growth stocks that tend to
make the headlines with stories of expansion and acquisition, it is hardly
surprising that this attention can cause overvaluation.
Corporate governance is another factor that gets
systematically mispriced. Paul Gompers, professor of business administration at
Harvard, Joy Ishii, assistant professor of finance at Stanford, and Andrew
Metrick, professor of finance at Yale, found that the stocks of companies with
good corporate governance outperformed those with poor corporate governance by
8.5 per cent per annum. Given that the well-governed companies were ones that
had lower levels of capital expenditure and made fewer acquisitions, this
anomaly is perhaps also explained by an interest in newspaper headlines.
Armed with this evidence, and having identified potential
winners, one then has to decide how much to commit to each. Here we turn to
mathematician John Kelly and his work on horse betting. He devised a very
simple formula, known as the Kelly Criterion, to determine what percentage of
your purse to bet on a particular horse, the equivalent perhaps of how much of
your portfolio to invest in a particular stock. If the market odds of a horse
winning were 5o per cent but you had an edge of some sort and believed its chances
were 55 per cent, the formula said you should bet 10 per cent of your purse to
maximise your winnings.
The empirical findings with respect to dividend yields and
corporate governance are so strong that one should consider them to represent a
considerable edge. While it is impossible to put a number on precisely what
that edge might be, the evidence strongly supports the case for putting 10 per
cent in a thoroughly researched, well-governed, high-yielding stock, not 1 per
cent.
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