(Published in the Financial Times on 26 Feb 2012)
Some domestic US fund managers argue that investors need not
bother with emerging markets: they can obtain exposure to emerging market
growth through developed market companies with substantial overseas sales.
Since active managers in the emerging world underperform, the argument
continues, why not buy a portfolio of multinationals?
The answer is: because they would miss great returns from
emerging markets companies that outperform.
Over time, stock markets should track economic performance.
Although this has held true in developed markets, it is much less evident in
the emerging world.
Over the past two decades, real GDP growth of emerging Asia
has been around 4 percentage points higher than that of the US. However, since
the end of 1987 — the inception of the index — the MSCI Emerging Asia index has
substantially lagged the MSCI US index.
Similar patterns can be seen at a country level. From 1992
to 2010 China's economy expanded by seven times in real terms but the MSCI
China index went nowhere. While the average Chinese listed company may have
created value for employees, suppliers, bankers, and local and national
governments, it destroyed value for shareholders.
Paradoxically, the strong growth of emerging economies may
cause the relatively poor performance of their companies. Many corporations,
transfixed by the growth opportunities, invest new capacity, often outside
their core area of expertise. A focus on top line growth rather than
profitability tended to result in destruction of shareholder value.
It is therefore right to be wary of the average emerging
markets company — but not all of them. Those disciplined about expansion tended
to be better performers over the long term. But discipline requires a strong
corporate culture that can take decades to build, unless there is a parent
company with a strong culture.
In a recent research paper* supported by Aberdeen, Martijn
Cremers, associate professor of finance at Yale School of Management, analysed
the performance of listed emerging markets affiliates of multinationals.
Unilever, for example, has listed affiliates in India, Indonesia and Pakistan
in which it owns stakes of 37 per cent, 85 per cent and 75 per cent
respectively. There were 92 such companies across the emerging world, 24 of
them in Asia, 46 in EMEA and 22 in Latin America.
Prof Cremers found the share price performance of listed
affiliates was vastly better than that of both emerging and developed markets broadly,
as well as their own local markets.
Over the 13 years from June 1998 to June 2011, a period
chosen for its balance between sample size and history length, an equally weighted
index of the 92 listed affiliates returned 2,229 per cent. This compared with
total returns of parents, local markets and parents' markets of 407 per cent,
1,157 per cent and 147 per cent respectively.
The pattern of outperformance was consistent across regions too. Affiliates in Latin America, Emea and Asia outperformed their local indices by 41, 134 and 50 percentage points respectively. Adjusted for volatility the affiliates' performance was even better, as many of them demonstrated defensive qualities during the 2008-09 financial crisis.
The pattern of outperformance was consistent across regions too. Affiliates in Latin America, Emea and Asia outperformed their local indices by 41, 134 and 50 percentage points respectively. Adjusted for volatility the affiliates' performance was even better, as many of them demonstrated defensive qualities during the 2008-09 financial crisis.
Prof Cremers says strong performance is attributable neither
to changes in affiliates' valuation (price-to-book ratio) nor to them being in
better performing industries. Instead he suggests two explanations.
First, the affiliates had adopted their parents' business
culture and corporate governance practices, and with them a focus on shareholder
returns. Second, financial support from the parents served the affiliates well
in good times but particularly during the difficult times.
While there will be homegrown success stories, they are hard
to identify other than with hindsight, and picking losers hurts. Listed multinational
affiliates, on the other hand, may offer more reliable pickings. A strong
corporate culture is hard to build so the competitive advantage companies in
this select group enjoy may be a sustainable one.
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